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Abstract
We consider two aspects of the commitment problem in price regulation with lob-
bying: the ratchet eﬀect and the hold-up problem. We set out a dynamic model
of price regulation with asymmetric information where the regulated ﬁrm can ‘buy
inﬂuence’ in a lobbying equilibrium. Firms can sink non-contractible, cost-reducing
investment but regulators cannot commit to future price levels. We fully characterize
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and show that the lobbying equilibrium can both
ameliorate the ratchet eﬀect and improve investment incentives by credibly oﬀering
the ﬁrm future rent. Simulations indicate signiﬁcant welfare gains are possible from
these two eﬀects and that a range of lobbying outcomes can achieve this result.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L51
Keywords: price regulation, commitment problem, ratchet eﬀect, under-investment
∗We would like to thank David Currie and participants at the CEPR IO Workshop on Regulation for
helpful comments and discussion. Remaining errors are ours.
†Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK;
e-mail: p.levine@surrey.ac.uk.Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Full Information and the Ramsey Optimum 6
2.1 The Model and Payoﬀs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 The Ramsey Optimum (RO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Asymmetric Information with Commitment 8
4 Asymmetric Information without Commitment 9
4.1 The Lobbying Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 The Second-Period Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3 The First-Period Investment Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4 First-Period Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5 The Lobbying Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.6 The Two-Period Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5 Capture and Welfare 24
6 Conclusions and Future Research 26
A Details of Second-Period Equilibrium Categories 31
B Details of The Investment Decision 32
C Details of First Period Equilibrium Categories 331 Introduction
In this paper, we address two problems faced by regulators. These relate to potential
commitment problems and the opportunities these present for capture by interest groups
(Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), chs 9, 13; Dixit (1996)). While each of these may often be
regarded as having negative impacts on regulatory outcomes, we suggest that this need
not be the case: in particular, we investigate the extent to which lobbying to inﬂuence a
regulated ﬁrm can compensate for the absence of a commitment mechanism and address
the incentive problems when commitment is not present. For concreteness, we consider
this issue in the case of privatised (and now regulated) industries.
Commitment problems can arise because regulatory policies tend to require inter-
mittent revision (to take account of new circumstances), or because the identity of the
regulator can change over time. Thus, in the UK (for example), independent regulators
of privatised utilities undertake price reviews every ﬁve years or so, while decisions on
pricing and investment may subsequently be changed.1 The change of stance brought
about by new regulators can be illustrated by the descriptions of Tom Winsor when he
was announced as the UK’s new rail regulator in 1999: “a ‘hawkish’ lawyer [appointed]
to toughen up rail regulation and make life more diﬃcult for the train operating compa-
nies.”2 The inability to commit in such settings generates cost ineﬃciencies via the familiar
ratchet eﬀect and through diﬃculties in encouraging long-term capital investments (the
‘hold-up problem’). Levy and Spiller (1994), Lyon (1995) and Newbery (1999) all present
evidence to conﬁrm the empirical relevance of these problems.3
Capture of regulated industries has been a concern since Stigler (1971). However, as
Dixit (1996) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) make clear, independent regula-
tors present especially fertile ground for successful lobbying because, by deﬁnition, the
‘independence’ implies that the regulator enjoys considerable discretion, ruling out a rule-
based solution to the commitment problem. In principle, such lobbying may come from
consumer or industry groups: Grossman and Helpman (2001), p. 3, cite research iden-
1For example, the electricity regulator (OFFER) was criticised for a lack of commitment following
post-review price-cap alterations in 1995: see EIA (1997).
2Daily Telegraph, 24 March, 1999; see also Daily Telegraph, 28 May, 1999.
3Even without a commitment problem, under-investment can occur if investment is irreversible and
there is exogenous uncertainty; see Dobbs (2004).
1tifying over 3,900 “trade, business and commercial” special interest groups. In addition,
its practical manifestation may be varied, ranging from side-payments to the regulator
to oﬀers of future employment (so-called “revolving doors”: Che (1995); Salant (1995)).
The nature of such practices can make them hard to detect yet the presence of capture in
regulatory settings has recently been well documented (e.g. Guasch (2004); Guasch et al.
(2005); Straub (2005)).
We consider a dynamic, non-commitment, model where the ﬁrm’s costs comprise an
exogenous productivity parameter, cost-reducing eﬀort and investment that is costly in
period 1 but reduces costs in period 2. The regulator observes total costs in a given period
but not any individual components. The presence of asymmetric information means that
welfare costs arise from suboptimal investment and the ratchet eﬀect. As in Grossman
and Helpman (1994), the regulated ﬁrm is able to invest in lobbying the regulator for
favourable contracts in the ﬁrst period. It does this by oﬀering the regulator a fraction
of any information rent it receives under the regulatory mechanism. We ask whether this
makes the regulator less averse to the ﬁrm’s rent and, thus, reduces under-investment
and the ratchet eﬀect. As discussed below, this method of modelling regulatory capture
diﬀers from other literature in this area. In addition to the capture aspect, we extend
the theoretical literature on regulation in two ways: (i) situations where the regulator
observes neither investment nor the other components of cost have received little attention
yet, for some types of activity, are clearly appropriate; (ii) we examine the problem in
the context of optimal (subject to asymmetric information) price regulation, where the
regulator is prevented from making lump-sum transfers to the ﬁrm. Both of these reﬂect
much regulatory practice.
Our main result is that capture can, indeed, help to overcome the dual eﬀects of
non-commitment on eﬀort and investment. As such, it can lower prices and raise social
welfare.4 The eﬀects of capture on investment result from its eﬀects on the marginal
beneﬁt and cost of investment. The marginal beneﬁt of investment arises from its positive
eﬀects on period 2 rents (since investment lowers these costs) and, as such, is inﬂuenced
4This result gives support to the intuitive discussion in Armstrong and Vickers (1996): in the context
of transition economies, “a degree of capture might enhance the credibility of commitment to allow an
adequate return on investment.” (p. 303). Interestingly, this view refers only to the ‘marginal beneﬁt
eﬀect’ we refer to below, and not to the ‘marginal cost eﬀect’ that we also uncover.
2by the degree of capture. More subtly, the marginal cost of investment is determined by
the cost of the eﬀort needed in period 1 to keep costs down when investment is ﬁrst sunk;
since the degree of capture aﬀects the power of the period 1 contracts, it therefore aﬀects
the marginal cost of investment (since eﬀort costs are increasing and convex). Investment
is determined when these marginal eﬀects are equal.
Our analysis identiﬁes some interesting implications of capture. First, because the rel-
ative magnitudes of the eﬀects of capture on the marginal costs and beneﬁts are generally
diﬀerent, there are a number of possible equilibria, each of them unique, as the degree of
capture changes. These can result in diﬀerent investment levels, depending on the unob-
served productivity level of the ﬁrm. Second, there are equilibria where over-investment,
as well as under-investment occurs. Third, we demonstrate the possibility that there is
an optimal degree of capture: beyond this, the ﬁrm’s lobbying of the regulator generates
investment and eﬀort but at the expense of excessive consumer prices. Kessides (2004)
identiﬁes such concerns when discussing a backlash against privatisation in Latin America
(most dramatically, in Bolivia and Argentina). Thus, as well as demonstrating potential
gains from capture, our paper also identiﬁes an important trade-oﬀ underlying this result
and several key factors that determine when the gains might be oﬀset.
A number of other authors have considered issues relating to independent regulation,
capture and, separately, investment by a regulated ﬁrm. Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) and
Laﬀont (2000) set out a general model of capture, without investment and with lump-sum
transfers as opposed to price regulation. The regulator is delegated the task of collecting
information about the regulated ﬁrm’s performance by a principal (‘Congress’) who, oth-
erwise, has incomplete information about this. Congress ultimately designs the revelation
mechanism for the ﬁrm. Here, capture involves biasing the regulator’s feedback to Congress
in return for a share of the information rents arising from the latter’s subsequent asym-
metric information problem. Although popular in the literature, this model of capture
diﬀers from ours in that we assume that the regulator determines pricing and investment
policy and, therefore, designs the ﬁrm’s contracts. As such, the ﬁrm directly lobbies the
regulator for favourable contract terms, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996)’s anal-
ysis of lobbying for trade policy.5 Our approach reﬂects institutional arrangements such
5For other examples, see Dixit (1996)—tax policy—Aidt (1998) and Fredriksson and Gaston (2000)—
environmental regulation, Trillas (2000)—privatization—and Baldwin and Robert-Micoud (2001)—support
3as those in the UK, where regulators act independently to set price and investment policy
in ‘price reviews’ (see Armstrong et al. (1994); Laﬀont (2005), pp. 198–200). Laﬀont
and Martimort (1998) discuss the general circumstances in which it is optimal to delegate
such decisions to an independent agent and, as such, under which our model of regulatory
capture is appropriate.
Martimort (1999) explicitly models problems that can arise when an independent reg-
ulator is captured in a setting with lump-sum transfers and no investment. In his model,
the regulator and the ﬁrm interact repeatedly over time and this leads to regulatory ‘drift’
in the sense that it becomes increasingly diﬃcult for Congress to design collusion-proof
contracts for the ﬁrm with the degree of ‘familiarity’ between ﬁrm and regulator increasing
over time. One solution to such problems, is the separation of regulatory powers between
several regulators (Olsen and Torsvick (1993); Laﬀont and Martimort (1999)). Here, cap-
ture is rendered a less eﬀective policy for ﬁrms because they are less able to inﬂuence the
web of policies by which they are regulated. Laﬀont (2005) makes a powerful case for
such a strategy in developing countries. As noted earlier, our paper considers possible
beneﬁts from capture and, thus, does not consider separation of powers. The mechanism
we identify would operate in qualitatively the same way in a setting like Martimort’s.
We are not alone in conjecturing that capture may be beneﬁcial in regulatory settings.
Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003) assume that the governing principal in Congress
can change identity between periods while the regulator does not, and contracts are static
(one-period) ones. In this setting, capture lends stability to the regulatory process because
it tends to pull the regulator towards the ﬁrm and away from changing political priorities.
If the beneﬁts of this stability oﬀset the costs of the information rent it produces, capture
can improve welfare.6 Che (1995) considers the eﬀects of ‘revolving door’ arrangements,
where regulators can expect employment within the regulated industry upon completion
of their terms of oﬃce (see also Salant (1995)). The model assumes that regulators (not
ﬁrms) make eﬀort choices (they can improve their industry-speciﬁc knowledge) and the
prospects of subsequent employment are shown to enhance this. The information set-up is
simpler than our combination of moral hazard and adverse selection and the ﬁrm’s capital
investment decision is not modelled, but Che conjectures that investment prospects may
to declining industries. See, more generally, Grossman and Helpman (2001).
6See also Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2005).
4be enhanced by giving the regulator an interest in the future recovery of sunk costs by her
future employer. Finally, de Figueiredo et al. (1999), Epstein and O’Halloran (1995) and
Sloof (2000) note positive informational externalities arising from capture: for example,
lobbies may provide (biased) information on regulated ﬁrms or on regulators.
Time inconsistency problems in regulatory settings are studied in Laﬀont and Tirole
(1993) and applied to investment incentives under complete and asymmetric information
assumptions. With complete information, Salant and Woroch (1992) and Newbery (1999)
(ch. 2) show how optimal investment can be sustained in a reputational equilibrium
provided the regulator is suﬃciently far-sighted.7 Besanko and Spulber (1992) (and Ur-
biztondo (1994)) and by Dalen (1995) assume asymmetric information. All three of these
papers assume that the regulator makes lump-sum transfers to the ﬁrm (rather than using
price regulation). Besanko and Spulber abstract from the ratchet eﬀect and focus on in-
vestment incentives in a dynamic non-commitment setting with observable investment but
unobservable ﬁxed costs. They show that under-investment can be avoided in sequential
equilibrium because the ﬁrm can use its (observable) investment decision to signal its ﬁxed
cost to the regulator. Dalen shows how contractible investment reduces the ratchet eﬀect
by inducing more ﬁrst-period separation. When investment is non-contractible, under-
investment occurs. By allowing for price regulation and unobservable cost-reducing eﬀort
and unobservable investment (as well as capture), our paper adds signiﬁcantly to this lit-
erature. The eﬀect is to increase the range of possible (unique) equilibria and to introduce
the possibilities of over- and under-investment.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we set out the model and the
full-information benchmark. Section 3 then introduces asymmetric information for the
regulator but in the presence of commitment. Section 4 relaxes the commitment assump-
tion and introduces a lobbying stage to the game. It fully characterises the perfect Bayesian
equilibria and investigates the eﬀects of capture on investment. Section 5 examines the
eﬀects of capture on welfare and demonstrates the potential existence of an optimal degree
of capture. Section 6 discusses our results.
7In a complete information set-up, Levine et al. (2005) draw comparisons between this and commitment
problems in monetary policy. They also identify some drawbacks with a reputational solution to the hold-
up problem as opposed to the lobbying solution of the current paper.
52 Full Information and the Ramsey Optimum
2.1 The Model and Payoﬀs
First, we set out the basic elements of the model in the absence of lobbying by the ﬁrm.
In period t = 1,2, the ﬁrm produces a quantity qt of a homogeneous good at cost
Ct = C(qt,et,βt) = βt − et + cqt; β1 = β + i; β2 = β − f(i) (1)
where et is total cost-reducing eﬀort of which an amount i, ‘investment’, is devoted to
reducing ﬁxed costs in the second period by an amount f(i).8 Marginal costs are ﬁxed
and given by c. We make the standard assumptions f′ > 0,f′′ < 0, f(0) = 0,f′(0) = ∞.
If we put f(i) ≡ 0, then i = 0 and there is no investment hold-up problem, but there
is a ratchet eﬀect. We also assume that the eﬃciency parameter is suﬃciently large to
ensure that ﬁxed costs are never negative; i.e., βt − et ≥ 0. The good is sold at a price
pt = φ(qt) where φ(·) is the inverse demand curve. The combined inclusion of et, i and
φ(·) distinguishes our set-up from other regulatory models.
Both the ﬁrm and regulator maximize a two-period welfare function with the same
discount factor δ and with single-period payoﬀs given respectively by
Ut = U(qt,et,βt) = R(qt) − Ct − ψ(et) (2)
Wt = W(qt,et,βt) = S(qt) − R(qt) + Ut (3)
In (2), ψ(et) is the disutility of eﬀort and again we make standard assumptions: ψ′, ψ′′ >
0 for et > 0, ψ(et) = 0 otherwise. In (3), S(qt) is the gross consumer surplus of the
industry, R(qt) = ptqt is the revenue, S(qt) − R(qt) is the net consumer surplus, so the
regulator maximizes the sum of net consumer and producer surpluses.
2.2 The Ramsey Optimum (RO)
We ﬁrst solve for the ‘Ramsey Optimum’ (RO); that is the social optimum subject to
a two-period individual rationality constraint for the ﬁrm in the absence of lobbying.9
8The assumption that eﬀort only reduces ﬁxed and not variable costs can be relaxed but at considerable
cost in terms of tractability. For example, we could assume two types of imperfectly substitutable eﬀort
with managers dividing their total eﬀort in each period between reducing ﬁxed and variable costs. Laﬀont
and Tirole (1993) consider situations where all eﬀort is devoted to reducing variable costs.
9We use the term ‘Ramsey-Optimal’ because the pricing formula involves a (Ramsey) inverse elasticity
mark-up to cover ﬁxed costs. Notice that the unconstrained social optimum would have pt = c and would
6This provides a full information benchmark for later results. Suppose that the social
planner adopts the single-period social welfare function (3). Then the RO is found by the
maximization of the intertemporal social welfare function Ω = W1 + δW2 with respect
to (qt, et), t = 1,2 and i, where Wt is given by (3) subject to a two-period individual
rationality constraint
IR : U1 + δU2 ≥ 0
To solve this maximization problem deﬁne a Lagrangian L = Ω +  (U1 + δU1) where
  is a Lagrangian multiplier. The Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order and complementary slackness
(CS) conditions are
et : ψ′(et) = 1; t = 1,2 (4)
i : δf′(i) = 1 (5)
qt : S′(qt) + + R′(qt) = (1 +  )c; t = 1,2 (6)
CS :  (U1 + δU2) = 0






(  + 1)η(qt)
(7)
where Lt is the Lerner index and η(qt) = −ptq′
t/qt is the elasticity of demand. It follows
from (7) that the price in each period is the same. Furthermore, since ﬁxed costs can never
be negative by assumption, this common price must exceed the marginal cost, otherwise
the IR constraint cannot be satisﬁed; thus Lt > 0. It follows from (7) that   > 0, and the






From (7) Ramsey prices p1 = p2 = pRO and hence output q1 = q2 = qRO are equal
in the two periods, but not yet determined. Denote by eRO and iRO the Ramsey-optimal
levels of e and i given by (4) and (5) respectively. Substituting back into the binding IR
constraint then determines the Ramsey-optimal output qRO and hence the price pRO =
φ(qRO), completing the social planner’s problem.10
require investment to be subsidized from lump-sum taxation.
10With commitment plus full information about total costs and demand, the RO can be implemented
73 Asymmetric Information with Commitment
We continue to assume there is no lobbying and seek to establish the nature of the commit-
ment problem in our model that leads to both the ratchet eﬀect and the hold-up problem.
First, we present results for the case where commitment is feasible, then we explain how
these break down when the regulator cannot commit to a contract with the ﬁrm.
In contrast with the previous section, suppose that neither eﬀort nor the productivity
parameter β are observed by the regulator so she faces both an adverse selection and
moral hazard problem. The regulator observes total cost and knows that β belongs to a
two-point support: β = β and β = β (β > β > 0), over which she holds priors ν1 and 1−ν1
respectively at the beginning of period 1. Investment does not need to be contractible,
nor indeed observable for our results to hold.
Asymmetric information now introduces dynamics through the process of learning
about the ﬁrm’s type. Following Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), the regulator must now de-
sign contracts (p
t,Ct), (pt,Ct),t = 1,2 for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms respectively.
In doing so, she must recognise the incentive compatibility constraints introduced by
asymmetric information: each ﬁrm can mimic the other’s costs by suitable choice of un-
observable eﬀort. Letting pC
1 = pC
2 = pC, pC
1 = pC
2 = pC, etc., denote the solution to this
problem is11
Proposition 1 (Commitment Equilibrium). Assume ﬁxed costs are always positive.
Then for the two-period contract under commitment we have that:
(i) eC = eRO; eC < eRO.
(ii) iC = i
C = iRO.
(iii) If the elasticity η(qt) is non-increasing in qt, pC > pC.
(iv) For both types of ﬁrm, rent is less in the ﬁrst period than the second. For the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm, rent is negative in the ﬁrst period and positive in the second.
Parts (i) and (iii) of this proposition reﬂect the single-period trade-oﬀ between eﬀort
if the regulator faces only moral hazard (β but not e or i observable) or adverse selection (e and i but
not β observable). In the former case, she commits to a two-period contract specifying only p
RO and
rent maximizing managers choose e
RO and i
RO. In the latter case, the regulator can calculate β from
observable cost, demand, eﬀort and investment.
11See Levine and Rickman (2001) for a proof of the case where investment is contractible. Proof of the
non-contractible and non-observable result is available from the authors.
8and rent that typiﬁes such incentive contracts (see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)). However,
(ii) tells us that the regulator’s ability to commit assures the ﬁrm of suﬃcient second-
period rent (see (iv)) to encourage Ramsey-optimal investment.
Having examined the nature of the commitment solution in the presence of asymmetric
information, now suppose that such commitment is not feasible. In this case, the contracts
described in Proposition 1 are time-inconsistent: although they are optimal ex ante, ex
post in period 2 they cease to be optimal and there exists a temptation for the regulator
to re-optimize. This temptation exists for two reasons. First, the contract is a revelation
mechanism that reveals the type of ﬁrm. In the second period an optimizing regulator
will oﬀer a new contract at a lower price that removes any information rent to the eﬃcient
ﬁrm. This is the familiar ‘ratchet eﬀect’ which, when anticipated by the eﬃcient ﬁrm,
requires higher information rent in the ﬁrst period to satisfy the ﬁrst-period incentive-
compatibility constraint. Second, the ﬁrst-period investment is a sunk-cost. The ex ante
contract sees negative rent in the ﬁrst period and positive rent in the second period for both
types. However, in the absence of a binding commitment, ex post an optimizing regulator
will renege on the promise of positive rent and oﬀer a new contract at a lower price just
suﬃcient to satisfy the second-period individual rationality constraint. Anticipating this
opportunistic behaviour, in the absence of commitment both ﬁrms will under-invest in the
ﬁrst period. We now move to a formal analysis of the non-commitment case in order to
show how the extent, or indeed the existence, of both these problems can be inﬂuenced
by the existence of lobbying.
4 Asymmetric Information without Commitment
4.1 The Lobbying Game
Consider a two-period, two-type lobbying game with the same structure and information
assumptions as section 3, but with the assumption that the regulator cannot commit
to a two-period price contract. The main contribution of the paper is to investigate
whether lobbying for inﬂuence by the ﬁrm can compensate for the absence of a commitment
mechanism. The sequence of events for the lobbying game is given by:
1. The ﬁrm makes a long-term commitment to a lobbying fund, proportional to and
9contingent on proﬁts (whatever they turn out to be), ℓUt; ℓ ∈ [0,1); t = 1,2.
2. Lobbying by the ﬁrm occurs and results in a monetary beneﬁt κℓUt; κ > 0 to the
regulator modifying the single period utility (3) which now becomes
Wt = W(qt,et,βt,α) = S(qt) − R(qt) + αUt (8)
where κ is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of the lobby and α = 1 + κℓ measures the
overall degree to which the regulator is captured, which may result from a larger
fund (ℓ) and/or more eﬀective lobbying (κ).12,13
3. The ﬁrm’s cost parameters β = β, β are realized and observed by the ﬁrm.
4. The regulator oﬀers a choice of two ﬁrst-period price contracts from which the ﬁrm
chooses one or neither.
5. First-period eﬀort e1 and investment i are applied by the ﬁrm, the cost C1 is realized
and observed by regulator.
6. The regulator updates her prior ν1 to ν2.
7. The regulator oﬀers a choice of two second-period contracts from which the ﬁrm
chooses one or neither.
8. Second-period eﬀort e2 is applied by the ﬁrm, the cost C2 is realized and observed
by regulator.
12We discuss possible determinants of κ in the Conclusions. Note that our concentration on lobbying
by the ﬁrm is largely for convenience: eﬀectively, we assume consumers are too atomized to conduct
an eﬀective lobby in their favour. In fact, in many countries, consumer groups have emerged to lobby





where the subscripts refer to Firm and Consumer lobbies respectively. We could endogenise ℓ
C in similar
fashion to the approach used below—with consumers oﬀering the regulator some share in the rent she
saves them from paying.
13The result that with lobbying a regulator would maximize a modiﬁed utility function that gives more
weight to the utility of the lobbying party (the ﬁrm), is also a feature of the ‘buying of inﬂuence model’ of
Grossman and Helpman (2001), chapter 7. In their complete information set-up, period-by-period choice
of the lobbying fund and joint eﬃciency gives rise to this result. By making the ﬁrm commit to a lobbying
fund contingent on proﬁts, whatever they turn out to be, our set-up rules out the regulator learning about
the type of ﬁrm as a result of observing the lobbying process at stage 3.
10The capture parameter α ≥ 1 is crucial in our analysis and measures the size, ℓ, and
the eﬀectiveness κ of the lobbying fund. Capture, in eﬀect, changes the preferences of
the regulator in a ‘pro-industry’ direction. Consider the solution to the game given α;
i.e., in the sub-game from stage 4 onwards. In the ﬁrst period, given ν1, the regulator
designs contracts (p
1,C1) and (p1,C1). In general we must consider equilibria in which the
eﬃcient ﬁrm may mimic the ineﬃcient and vice versa. When the eﬃcient ﬁrm chooses the
low cost contract it chooses output q
1 = φ−1(p
1) and eﬀort (e1,i) such that observed cost
C1 = β −e1 +i+cq
1. Similarly when the ineﬃcient ﬁrm chooses the high cost contract it
chooses output q1 = φ−1(p1) and eﬀort (e1,i) such that observed cost C1 = β−e1+i+cq1.
Denote mimicking eﬀort for the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms by (˜ e1,˜ i) and (˜ e1,˜ i) and
∆β ≡ β − β.14 In order to realize the appropriate observed costs, these mimicking eﬀorts
must satisfy
˜ e1 = e1 − ∆β +˜ i − i; ˜ e1 = e1 + ∆β +˜ i − i (9)
Suppose that the eﬃcient ﬁrm chooses the low cost contract with probability x and the
high cost contract with probability 1−x. Similarly suppose that the ineﬃcient ﬁrm chooses
the high cost contract with probability y and the low cost contract with probability 1−y.
The appropriate equilibrium concept for this game is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
found by backward induction starting at stage 8. We deﬁne the regulator’s information
sets at this point as follows: H (resp. L) if (p1,C1) (resp. (p
1,C1)) was accepted in period
1.
4.2 The Second-Period Contract
At L and H, the regulator designs contracts (p
2,C2), and (p2,C2) for low and high cost
types respectively, given the (updated) probabilities ν2(L) and ν2(H) that the ﬁrm is
eﬃcient. At L we have that β
2 = β − f(i) and β2 = β − f(˜ i). Similarly at H, β
2 =
β − f(˜ i) and β2 = β − f(i). Contracts must be designed to satisfy the following incentive
14We adopt the following notation: ˜ z is some outcome for the eﬃcient ﬁrm who mimics the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm and ˜ z is the corresponding outcome for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm who mimics the eﬃcient ﬁrm.
11compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints for each ﬁrm:
IC2 : U2 ≥ ˜ U2 = U2 + Φ(e2)
IC2 : U2 ≥ ˜ U2 = U2 − Φ(e2 + ∆β2)
IR2 : U2 ≥ 0
IR2 : U2 ≥ 0
where Φ(e2) = ψ(e2)−ψ(e2−∆β2) and Φ(e2+∆β2) = ψ(e2+∆β2)−ψ(e2) are the ﬁrms’
information rents. Because IC2 + IR2 ⇒ IR2, we can drop the latter constraint.
It is convenient to formulate the regulator’s problem in terms of the choice of output
and eﬀort levels bearing in mind that contracts are designed as prices, contingent on
observed total costs. The regulator’s problem, to be carried out at each information set
characterized by the state variables given by the vector s = [ν2, β
2,β2], is now:
Given s = [ν2,β
2,β2], choose (q2,e2) and (q
2,e2) to maximize the expected welfare
E[W2] = Ω2 = ν2W(q
2,e2,β
2,α) + (1 − ν2)W(q2,e2,β2,α) (10)
subject to IC2, IC2 and IR2.
To solve this optimization problem, let  2 ≥ 0, ζ2 ≥ 0 and ξ2 ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian
multipliers associated with the IC2, IC2 and IR2 constraints respectively. Then deﬁning
the Lagrangian
L2 = Ω2 +  2(U2 − U2 − Φ(e2)) + ζ2(U2 − U2 + Φ(e2 + ∆β2)) + ξ2U2







 2 − ζ2 + ν2(α − 1)







ξ2 −  2 + ζ2 + (1 − ν2)(α − 1)
(ξ2 −  2 + ζ2 + (1 − ν2)α)η(q2)
(12)
(ν2α +  2 − ζ2)(1 − ψ′(e2)) = −ζ2Φ′(e2 + ∆β2) (13)
((1 − ν2)α + ξ2 −  2 + ζ2)(1 − ψ′(e2)) =  2Φ′(e2) (14)
 2(U2 − U2 − Φ(e2)) = 0 (15)
ζ2(U2 − U2 + Φ(e2 + ∆β2)) = 0 (16)
ξ2U2 = 0 (17)
12To characterize the period 2 equilibrium and how it is aﬀected by the degree of capture
we need to examine the behaviour of the constraints as α increases. In Appendix A we
characterize three second period equilibrium categories, depending on the value of α ≥ 1.
In particular, there are threshold values α2 > α2 > 1 such that:
• α ∈ (1,α2]: IC2 and IR2 both bind. We call this second-period equilibrium type b.
• α ∈ (α2,α2]: IR2 binds. We call this second-period equilibrium type c.
• α > α2: unconstrained. We call this second-period equilibrium type d.
Notice that, in principle, we could have a second-period equilibrium, type a say, in
which all three constraints IC2, IC2 and IR2 bind. A familiar one-period result for a
utilitarian regulator (α = 1) is that IC2 does not bind (see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)) and
therefore ξ2 = 0. Since the eﬀect of increasing α is to relax constraints, this means that
equilibrium type a does not exist in the second period for α > 1 either. Equilibrium type
b is then the familiar result for a single-period model. As α increases (i.e. as the regulator
becomes more captured), ﬁrst IC2 ceases to bind ( 2 = 0) at α = α2 and then IR2 ceases
to bind too (ξ2 = 0), at α = α2.15 We thus move from equilibrium type b to c, then d as
the regulator becomes more captured.
The intuition is as follows. Since p2 > p
2 there is no incentive for the ineﬃcient
type to mimic the eﬃcient type. Therefore constraint IC2 does not bind. The following
possibilities remain: IC2 and IR2 bind (i.e., equilibrium b), only IC2 binds, only IR2
binds, and no constraints bind. Of these, an equilibrium with only IC2 binding must be
sub-optimal because it implies rent for the ineﬃcient type which must also be passed on to
the eﬃcient type. As α increases, the progression between each equilibrium tells us that
the increasingly generous regulator eventually supplies enough rent to the eﬃcient ﬁrm to
remove its incentive to mimic, and then allows the ineﬃcient ﬁrm positive rent.
By setting the appropriate multipliers to zero in (11)–(17), and eliminating the rest,
we can determine the nature of the second period contracts oﬀered for diﬀerent degrees
of capture; see Appendix A. Thus for α ∈ (0,α2] to oﬀer a high-powered contract to the
eﬃcient ﬁrm (ψ′(e2) = 1) and one involving a measure of cost-sharing for the ineﬃcient
15As can be conﬁrmed from (14) to (17) this order for relaxing the constraints assumes η
′(q2) ≤ 0 and
e
RO > ∆β2. The ﬁrst of these implies p
2 < p2 (See Levine and Rickman (2001) for further details.)
13one (ψ′(e2) < 1). More captured regulators (α > α2) oﬀer high-powered contracts to both
ﬁrms and secure Ramsey-optimal eﬀort in either case. At the same time, the fact that
more rent is available to both ﬁrms as α increases will provide investment incentives in
period 1. We now turn to this investment decision.
4.3 The First-Period Investment Decision
Our analysis now moves to the ﬁrst period where there are two decisions: the ﬁrm’s in-
vestment decision and the regulator’s contract oﬀers. Beginning with the former, consider
a ﬁrm of either type who has accepted a ﬁrst-period contract specifying price and cost,
(p1,C1), and faces the prospect of a rent U2 = U(q2,e2,β2) corresponding to one of the
second-period equilibria b,c or d at L or H. From the second-period optimization we know
that (q2,e2) is a function of the state vector s = [ν2,β
2,β2] at the relevant information
set. Thus we can write U2 = U2(s). Then given (p1,C1) and therefore q1 = φ−1(p1), the
ﬁrm chooses i to maximize
U1 + δU2 = p1q1 − C1 − ψ(β + i + cq1 − C1) + δU2(β2(i)) (18)
The ﬁrst-order condition for a local maximum (we consider whether this is also global
below) is




using β2 = β − f(i), from which β′
2(i) = −f′(i). This is the familiar condition that the
marginal cost of investment (MC(e1) ≡ ψ′(e1)) must equal its marginal beneﬁt (MB(i) ≡
−δ ∂U2
∂β2 f′(i)). It is immediately apparent that the ﬁrm’s investment decision depends on
its ﬁrst-period eﬀort and anticipated second-period rent: the former oﬀsets the eﬀects
of i on costs; the latter funds the investment. Accordingly, the regulator can inﬂuence
investment behaviour through the power of the ﬁrst-period contract and the credibility of
oﬀers of future rent (i.e., prices). In particular, the position of the MB curve is determined
by the capture parameter α since diﬀerent second-period equilibrium categories (b, c, d)
generate diﬀerent U2 and, thus, diﬀerent ∂U2



























Stated diﬀerently, the condition in (21) is that MB(i) is decreasing in i.16 Recalling (5),
(19) tells us that the ﬁrm’s choice of investment is optimal (i = iRO) when ψ′(e1) =| ∂U2
∂β2 |=
1; i.e., the ﬁrm must get a one-for-one return on its investment in period 2. Equation (4)
then tells us that optimal investment also requires e = eRO.
Figure 1 illustrates our results; both parts show optimal MB and MC curves, along
with a pair relating to a low-powered contract and a regulator who generates | ∂U2
∂β2 |< 1 (so
that the ﬁrm’s rent does not fully beneﬁt from its investment). Here, the second-period
prospects for lower rent and the low power of the ﬁrst-period contract (which reduces
the marginal cost of investment) work in opposite directions: the former lowering and
the latter raising investment. Depending on which eﬀect dominates we can have under-
or over-investment (Figures 2a and b respectively). Thus the value of | ∂U2
∂β2 | is crucial
for the investment decision and Appendix B provides details of this expression for the
second-period equilibrium categories b, c and d.
As we have stated, (19) deﬁnes a local optimum. If the ﬁrm chooses to invest at
all it will choose i = i(e1). However the ﬁrm may choose not to invest. Given the
anticipated second-period regulated price (which depends on α), i = i(e1) is preferable to
no investment, i = 0, only if −ψ(e1) + δU2(β2(i)) > −ψ(e1 − i) + δU2(β2(0)); i.e.,
δ[U2(β2(i)) − U2(β2(0))] > ψ(e1) − ψ(e1 − i) (22)
This investment condition states that the second-period price must be suﬃcient for the
future gain in rent to outweigh the current marginal cost of investing. Notice that if, in the
second period, the constraint IR2 binds then U2(β2(i)) = U2(β2(0) = 0 and (22) cannot
hold for i > 0. Only when the capture is such that α > α2 and we have a second-period
equilibrium type d, can this condition hold for both the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrm. How-
ever, the eﬃcient ﬁrm may optimally invest, or over-invest, in second-period equilibrium
categories b, c and d because of the existence of information rent. We summarize our
results on the ﬁrm’s investment decision in the following proposition:
16For small changes in β
2 and β2 we can linearise U2(s) around β and β, the second term in this condition
can be ignored and the condition becomes
∂U2
∂β2 f
′′(i) > 0. Since f
′′ < 0 and
∂U2
∂β2 < 0 is necessary for any
investment, the condition then holds. We are not able to show that the condition holds more generally,
but numerical results indicate that this may be the case.
15Proposition 2 (The ﬁrm’s investment decision). There is an investment-eﬀort trade-
oﬀ in the ﬁrst period and more investment can only be secured at the expense of lower eﬀort
(i.e., a lower power contract) in the ﬁrst period, provided (22) and the condition in (21)
are satisﬁed. Over-investment or under-investment can occur.
It is interesting that, in principle, the regulator’s commitment problem can generate
over-investment as well as under-investment. We now examine the regulator’s ﬁrst-period
contract oﬀer and conﬁrm that both forms of investment behaviour can arise in equilib-
rium. We also examine how a suﬃcient degree of capture may achieve Ramsey-optimal
investment.
Figure 1: Determinants of under/over-investment
4.4 First-Period Contract
Now consider the design of contracts (p
1,C1) and (p1,C1), given ν1. Since the eﬃcient
ﬁrm may mimic the ineﬃcient ﬁrm with probability 1 − x, and the ineﬃcient may mimic
the eﬃcient ﬁrm with probability 1 − y, the probabilities of arriving at L and H are
Pr(L) = ν1x + (1 − ν1)(1 − y) and Pr(H) = ν1(1 − x) + (1 − ν1)y. Then by Bayes’ Rule
16we have






(ν1x + (1 − ν1)(1 − y))
(23)






(ν1(1 − x) + (1 − ν1)y)
(24)
It is convenient to formulate the regulator’s problem in terms of the choice of out-
put and eﬀort levels and the probabilities x and y. With E[W2] = Pr(L)E[W2 | L] +
Pr(H)E[W2 | H], the ﬁrst-period optimization problem given α is:
Given ν1, choose x,y, (q1,e1) and (q
1,e1) to maximize
Ω = E[W1 + δW2] = ν1[xW(q
1,e1,β + i(e1),α) + (1 − x)W(q1,˜ e1,β + i(˜ e1),α)]
+ (1 − ν1)[yW(q1,e1,β + i(e1),α) + (1 − y)W(q
1,˜ e1,β + i(˜ e1),α)]
+ δE[W2] (25)
subject to IC1, IC1, IR1 and IR1.
Let the rent obtained when each ﬁrm mimics the other be given by
˜ U1 = U1 + ψ(e1) − ψ(˜ e1); ˜ U1 = U1 + ψ(e1) − ψ(˜ e1) (26)
where from (9) and (19) we have that ˜ e1 = e1 − ∆β + i(˜ e1) − i(e1) and ˜ e1 = e1 + ∆β +
i(˜ e1) − i(e1). Hence ˜ e1 = ˜ e1(e1) and ˜ e1 = ˜ e1(e1) and (26) can be written
˜ U1 = U1 + Θ(e1); ˜ U1 = U1 − Γ(e1)
Also, let s(L) and s(H) denote the state vectors at L and H respectively. Then the
ﬁrst-period incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are given by:
IC1 : U1 + δU2(s(L)) ≥ ˜ U1 + δU2(s(H))
IC1 : U1 + δU2(s(H)) ≥ ˜ U1 + δU2(s(L))
IR1 : U1 + δU2(s(L)) ≥ 0
IR1 : U1 + δU2(s(H)) ≥ 0
Once again, it is clear that IC1 + IR1 ⇒ IR1 so that we can ignore the latter. Also,
since U2 = 0 in second-period equilibrium b and c, and U2 is independent of L and H
17in equilibrium d, we must have that U2(s(H)) = U2(s(L)). The IC1 constraint therefore
simpliﬁes to U1 ≥ ˜ U1.
As before, to solve this optimization problem, we let  1 ≥ 0, ζ1 ≥ 0 and ξ1 ≥ 0 be
the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the IC1, IC1 and IR1 constraints respectively.
Then the Lagrangian and ﬁrst-order conditions are given by:







 1 − ζ1 + (ν1x + (1 − ν1)(1 − y))(α − 1)







ξ1 −  1 + ζ1 + (ν1(1 − x) + (1 − ν1)y)(α − 1)
[ξ1 −  1 + ζ1 + (ν1(1 − x) + (1 − ν1)y))α]η(q1)
(28)
(αν1x +  1 − ζ1)(1 − ψ′(e1)) + ζ1Γ′(e1)
− [αν1x(1 − δf′(i)) +  1(1 − ψ′(e1)) − ζ1]i′(e1)
− α(1 − ν1)(1 − y)(1 − δf′(˜ i))i′(˜ e1)˜ e
′
1(e1) = 0 (29)
(α(1 − ν1)y + ξ1 −  1 + ζ1)(1 − ψ′(e1)) −  1Θ′(e1)
− [α(1 − ν1)y(1 − δf′(i)) + ξ1(1 − ψ′(e1)) −  1 + ζ1]i′(e1))
− [αν1(1 − x)(1 − δf′(˜ i)) +  1ψ′(˜ e1)]i′(˜ e1)˜ e′
1(e1) = 0 (30)
 1(U1 − ˜ U1 − δ(U2(s(H)) − U2(s(L))) = 0 (31)
ζ1(U1 − ˜ U1) = 0 (32)
ξ1(U1 + δU2(s(H))) = 0 (33)
In period 1, unlike period 2 the IC1 constraint can bind. The reason for this is the
ratchet eﬀect: the higher rent required by the eﬃcient type to prevent it from mimicking
and thus enjoying information rent in the second period is also attractive to the ineﬃcient
ﬁrm. The ratchet eﬀect increases with the discount factor δ (and disappears as δ → 0
where the set-up in eﬀect is static). As the weight α increases in period 2, second-period
equilibrium categories c then d emerge, oﬀering the β-ﬁrm second-period rent even when it
reveals its type in period 1. This in turn reduces the ratchet eﬀect and constraints IC1,IC1
and IR1 cease to bind in that order giving four ﬁrst-period equilibrium categories: ‘type
18a’ where all bind, ‘type b’ where IC1 and IR1 bind, ‘type c’ where only IR1 binds and
‘type d’ the unconstrained case. The intuition is the same as that set out for the second
period.
4.5 The Lobbying Decision
The equilibrium is now completed with the choice of the lobbying fund by the ﬁrm at the
beginning of the game. In general the rents of the ﬁrm will depend on the lobbying eﬀort,
the realization of the cost parameters and the type of equilibria that result, in particular
on whether the IR constraints bind or not in a particular period. Given our sequencing
the important feature of this choice is that it is made before the realization of the cost
parameter β and is therefore the same for both types of ﬁrm.
At the beginning of the game the rents are functions of the size of the lobbying fund ℓ;
i.e., Ut = Ut(ℓ) and the ﬁrm maximizes (1−ℓ)E[U1(ℓ)+δU2(ℓ)]. The ﬁrst order condition








= U1(ℓ) + δU2(ℓ)
 
(34)
In (34) expectations are formed over the realizations of the parameter β and the relation-
ships Ut(ℓ) must take into account which equilibrium is appropriate given the choice of
ℓ. The ﬁrm will need to choose a global maximum over ℓ. Although in general this is a
complicated calculation, its main feature is intuitive: the size of the lobbying fund will
depend on its eﬀectiveness at buying inﬂuence and this in turn is measured by the size
of the parameter κ deﬁning α = 1 + κℓ in (8). As κ → 0 then lobbying becomes totally
ineﬀective and the ﬁrm will choose ℓ = 0. As κ increases so does the incentive to invest in
a lobbying fund; ie., ℓ = ℓ(κ); ℓ(0) = 0, l′ > 0.
4.6 The Two-Period Equilibrium
Taking the second and ﬁrst-period contracts together, we now have a number of possible
outcomes, depending on the cost and demand conditions and, in particular, the degree of
capture, α. Each conﬁguration of parameters determines which IC and IR constraints
bind in each period. Table 1 sets out the possibilities. Each row describes a particular
combination of ﬁrst-period constraints. The columns describe second-period constraints
19and depend on whether a low cost (L) or high cost (H) ﬁrst-period contract has been
observed.17 The degree of capture, α, is particularly crucial for determining which equi-
librium type applies. As with the second-period contract, each of these outcomes can
be characterized by setting the relevant multipliers to zero in (27)–(32) and solving the
resulting simpliﬁed ﬁrst-order conditions: see Appendix B.
IC2L,IR2L IR2L None IC2H,IR2H IR2H None
IC1,IC1,IR1 (a,bL) (a,cL) (a,dL) (a,bH) (a,cH) (a,dH)
IC1,IR1 (b,bL) (b,cL) (b,dL) (b,bH) (b,cH) (b,dH)
IR1 (c,bL) (c,cL) (c,dL) (c,bH) (c,cH) (c,dH)
None (d,bL) (d,cL) (d,dL) (d,bH) (d,cH) (d,dH)
Table 1. The Two-Period Equilibrium
In fact we can rule out some of the outcomes in Table 1. The ratchet eﬀect means that
ﬁrst-period constraints IC1 and IC1 must bind before their second-period counterparts.
Similarly IR1 must bind before IR2; otherwise the contracts oﬀer rent to the ineﬃcient
type in the ﬁrst period, but not the second; yet the only reasons for oﬀering the ineﬃcient
type rent would be a captured regulator who suﬃciently favours rent, in which case she
would oﬀer it in both periods (equilibrium (d,d)), or a regulator who wishes to encourage
investment, in which case rent is oﬀered in the second-period only. These considerations
imply that as α increases above unity, second-period constraints cease before their ﬁrst-
period counterparts, ruling out the lower-diagonal equilibrium categories (c,bL),(d,bL),
(d,cL) and (c,bH),(d,bH), (d,cH).
Table 1 provides the main insights into the eﬀects of a particular degree of capture;
once lobbying has determined α, the type of equilibrium follows immediately. It is clear
that only equilibrium categories (∗,d) can generate investment by the ineﬃcient ﬁrm since
U2 > 0 only when IR2 slackens. Similarly, as we move from (b,∗) to (c,∗), increasingly
credible promises of future rent gradually overcome the ratchet eﬀect (IC ceases to bind)
and e1 and e1 can both equal eRO (see Appendix B)—a necessary condition for i = iRO.
17Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), chapter 9, derive a non-commitment PBE equilibrium for a procurement
problem where contracts are transfers conditional on cost, there is no capture (α = αs = 1), and no
investment. What they call types III and I equilibria correspond to our equilibrium categories (a,b) and
(b,b) respectively.
20Of course, because removing the ratchet eﬀect reduces rents, prices can fall when this
happens.
Focusing more closely on investment behaviour, and ﬁrst period eﬀort consider Figures
2 and 3. These provide a numerical example of how investment and ﬁrst period eﬀort
respectively are aﬀected by the degree of capture and can be explained using Table 1.18
Note that Figure 3 excludes e1 (= eRO = 1) for simplicity. For our choices of functional
forms and parameter values (a,∗) equilibrium categories do not occur, but if they did we
ﬁnd in Appendix C the possibility of all eﬀorts and investment being greater or less than
the Ramsey optimum.19
Figure 2: Capture and Investment
18We choose functional forms: ψ(e) =
γ
2(max(0,e))
2, q = φ(p) = Ap
−η ,η > 1 and f(i) = Bi
θ; θ ∈ (0,1),
and parameters: β = 2, β = 2.5, c = γ = B = 1, A = 10, η = 1.5, ν1 = θ = 0.5, δ = 0.9 and α = αs = 1
(no capture). With these choices we have e




19For the (b,∗) type equilibrium categories, which do occur, the optimal incentive mechanism is found
by maximizing the social welfare function over x ∈ [0,1], where, we recall, x is the probability that the
eﬃcient ﬁrm mimics the ineﬃcient ﬁrm in period 1. However here we avoid the complications arising
from x changing with every parameter combination and present results for an exogenously chosen x = 0.5.
Thus, we actually underestimate the potential welfare gains from limited capture reported in section 5.
All numerical results are obtained using programs written in MATLAB. These are available to the reader
on request.
21Figure 3: Capture and ﬁrst-period eﬀort
To begin with, the degree of capture is such as to produce equilibrium type (b,b).
Using Appendices B and C and Figure 2, we can characterize investment for this type as
follows. First, since IR2 binds, i = 0. Next, suppose the eﬃcient ﬁrm does not mimic the
ineﬃcient one (i.e. (b,bL)). From Appendix B, e1 = eRO (since IC1 does not bind); from
Appendix B, we have | ∂U2
∂β2 |< 1 and therefore from (19) MB(i) = δ | ∂U2
∂β2 | f′(i) < δf′(i).
Referring back to Figure 1, we thus have 0 < i < iRO—assuming (22) holds (otherwise
i = 0). Thus, under-investment or, as in Figure 3, no investment occurs. Now suppose
that the eﬃcient ﬁrm mimics (i.e. (b,bH)). We now have ˜ e1 < eRO (see Figure 3 and
Appendix C) along with MB(i) < δf′(i). From Figure 1 (and assuming (22) holds) the
lower marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt of investment lead to ˜ i T iRO; in our example
the net eﬀect is under-investment.
With a higher degree of capture (higher α) we move through the various (b,∗) equilib-
rium categories and at around α = 1.32 the regulator is suﬃciently pro-rent as to generate
equilibrium type (b,c) and then, as α increases, (b,d). When the latter is reached, we
know that both the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrm may now invest since IR2 slackens, and
indeed, the ineﬃcient ﬁrm can over-invest if e1 < eRO. However the investment condition
(22) must also be satisﬁed. Since the ineﬃcient ﬁrm receives no information rent in the
second period this condition is only satisﬁed at higher values of α than for the eﬃcient
22ﬁrm. In Figure 2 this does not happen and in equilibrium categories (b,c) and (b,d) the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm does not invest at all.
For the eﬃcient ﬁrm, when (b,c) is reached, non-mimicking investment is Ramsey-
optimal as can be conﬁrmed from Appendix C (no mimicking so e1 = eRO) and Appendix
B (MB(i) = −1). However its mimicking investment involves over-investment; see Figure
2. This is because its marginal cost of investment is low (˜ e1 < eRO) while its MB(i)
is optimal. Thus, as noted in Proposition 2, we have the interesting prospect of the
regulator’s commitment problem creating over-investment.
Still more captured regulators move us towards the bottom righthand corner of the
table (through (c,∗) equilibrium categories for α ∈ [1.45,1.47]), then (d,∗), as IC1, and
IR1 cease to bind in turn. Now e1 = e1 = eRO and Ramsey-optimal investment by both
eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms can take place if the investment condition (22) holds, as
is the case in Figure 2. Then the marginal cost of investment is Ramsey-optimal and
the regulator is suﬃciently captured that the marginal beneﬁt of investment is similarly
optimal (Appendices B and C).
It is also possible to conﬁrm (see Levine and Rickman (2001)) that as the (b,d) equi-
librium type is entered, the regulator is oﬀering suﬃcient second-period rent to prevent
the ratchet eﬀect from taking place. Thus, at this point, regulated prices fall as they no
longer take account of the extra information rent required by the eﬃcient ﬁrm.
Working through Table 1 in the above fashion gives us:
Lemma 1. Any positive investment requires (22) to hold, otherwise investment is zero.
Then the equilibrium categories exhibit the following ﬁrst-period eﬀort and investment be-
haviour:
(a,b),(a,c) : ˜ i,i T iRO,i = 0




e1,˜ e1,e1,˜ e1 T eRO
(b,b) : ˜ i T iRO,i < iRO,i = 0
(b,c) : ˜ i > iRO,i = iRO,i = 0
(b,d) : ˜ i, i > iRO, i = iRO

   
   
e1 = eRO ; e1, ˜ e1 < eRO
(c,c) : i = iRO,i = 0




e1 = e1 = eRO
23Bringing Lemma 1 together with the eﬀect of α on the constraints yields the following
result:
Proposition 3 (Capture and investment). Unlike relatively utilitarian regulators,
relatively captured ones are able to guarantee Ramsey-optimal investment (if suﬃciently
captured) by both ﬁrms. A necessary condition for Ramsey-optimal investment is α > α2
where α2 is the regulator’s weight on rent at which all second period IC and IR constraints
cease to bind. The suﬃcient condition is that α must rise further to insure Ramsey-optimal
investment is preferable to no investment and (22) is satisﬁed.
It is clear that capture can help to address the regulator’s commitment problem. This
is a signiﬁcant result and, as the intuitive arguments in Armstrong and Vickers (1996)—
see Footnote (4)—suggest, it could have value in a variety of economies. As we have
seen, however, matters are complicated by the fact that the marginal costs and beneﬁts of
investment are inﬂuenced by other policy concerns: the desires to encourage cost-reducing
eﬀort and to reveal information about the ﬁrm’s productivity parameter (β). As such, a
variety of investment outcomes are possible. Thus, we now move to the overall welfare
eﬀects of a captured regulator and the investment she may induce.
5 Capture and Welfare
We have seen that capture can result in a regulator with a capture parameter α that
increases investment, reduce the ratchet eﬀect and results in both lower prices, beneﬁting
consumers, and higher rent: it can, in other words, be Pareto improving. This section
investigates these welfare gains further, compares them with the welfare gain from full
commitment and examines the scope for excessive capture that is welfare reducing. First
consider the single-period social welfare:
Wt = S(pt) − R(pt) + αsUt = W(pt,Ut,αs)
where αs < α represents the weight on rent chosen by the social planner. In what follows,
we assume a utilitarian loss function with αs = 1. Having obtained prices and rents in a
24Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium given α, we can write the two-period social welfare as
Ω(α,1) = ν1[xW(p
1(α),U1(α),1) + (1 − x)W(p1(α), ˜ U1(α),1)]
+ (1 − ν1)[yW(p1(α),U1(α),1) + (1 − y)W(p
1(α), ˜ U1(α),1)] + E[W2(α,1)]
where
E[W2(α,1)] = (ν1x + (1 − ν1)(1 − y))E[W2|L) + (ν1(1 − x) + (1 − ν1)y)E[W2|H]
E[W2|L] = ν2LW(p
2L(α),U2L(α),1) + (1 − ν2L)W(p2L(α),U2L(α),1)
E[W2|H] = ν2HW(p
2H(α),U2H(α),1) + (1 − ν2H)W(p2H(α),U2H(α),1)
We measure the welfare gain from capture, G(α), as follows. Let ΩC = ΩC(αs) be the





Thus G(α) ≤ 100% and measures the extent to which limited capture can substitute for
full commitment.
Figure 4: Welfare gains from capture with zero, intermediate and high levels
of investment
Figure 4 plots G(α) against α for B = {0,1,1.5}. The case of B = 0 shows the ability
of limited capture to mitigate the ratchet eﬀect on its own, without investment consider-
ations. For B > 0, the case with investment, these results demonstrate the possibility of
25signiﬁcant welfare gains.20 However without investment considerations a regulator who is
only slightly too captured leads to a welfare loss: the negative welfare eﬀects of increasing
rent (i.e., prices) cut in quickly. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of capture is far more robust (and the
range of beneﬁcial outcomes is considerably wider) if investment is introduced, especially
if its impact on costs is at the higher level of B = 1.5.
Proposition 4 (Capture and Welfare). Numerical results demonstrate that welfare
can be increased by limited capture, for which there is an optimal degree. As investment
becomes more eﬀective, a wider range of capture levels increases welfare.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
The question of how to encourage investment (and eﬀort) by regulated industries is a
central one for regulators. Problems arise because despite the beneﬁts of both inputs (lower
costs), regulators ex post have an incentive to lower prices, which ﬁrms anticipate: a high
price bias results. A number of authors have identiﬁed the resulting ‘under-investment’ in
a variety of regulatory settings. The present paper considers a dynamic non-commitment
problem and makes several contributions to the analysis of the under-investment problem.
First, we show how a suﬃcient degree of capture can result in a pro-rent regulator and
overcome the under-investment problem (as well as the ratchet eﬀect that also arises
in the model); as such, Pareto improvements are possible, with higher rents but lower
prices emerging. In addition, our analysis takes place within a more detailed (and, we
suggest for many regulatory environments, more satisfactory) model than has previously
been studied. In particular, we focus on non-contractible investment in the presence of
asymmetric information about other cost-reducing eﬀort by the ﬁrm, and the regulator
is prevented from using transfers in order to reimburse the ﬁrm. The full set of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria is characterised.
20It is clear from our numerical example that, given our choice of parameter values, there exists an
‘optimal degree of capture’. It would be desirable to produce an analytical existence result, but this is
precluded by the complexities of the set-up that includes two-period dynamics, moral hazard and adverse
selection—all essential ingredients in the regulation game with investment. Our result is consistent with
literature from Latin America, where capture concerns have lead to substantial public backlashes against
privatised ﬁrms—see Kessides (2004).
26Our results throw some light on how a regulatory regime might achieve eﬀective regula-
tion. This must achieve: (i) the freedom to respond to the latest information regarding the
industry; i.e., it must involve discretion; (ii) socially optimal investment and eﬀort, ruling
out direct controls or ‘rate-of-return’ regulation and (iii) consumer beneﬁts from higher
investment through lower prices. Our paper shows that, with discretion, price regulation
by a suﬃciently, but not excessively, captured regulator will achieve these objectives.
This, in a sense, is a positive rather than normative result. If we observe good regula-
tion it could be coming about through this mechanism. To derive normative conclusions
we note that, in common with much of the strategic delegation literature, we have relo-
cated the problem as one of having just the correct degree of capture, α, but we have not
addressed directly how this correct degree of capture could be engineered. Part of the
answer here involves factors aﬀecting the level of capture. We have modelled this as being
determined by the size of the lobbying fund chosen by the regulated ﬁrm (ℓ) and (for a
given size of fund) by its degree of ‘eﬀectiveness’ (κ). While the former is endogenous
to the model, the latter reﬂects exogenous political and/or institutional elements of the
economy. In this respect, our results are consistent with observations made by Laﬀont
(2005). For example, high pay for regulators that increase the marginal cost of dismissal
and rules that forbid revolving doors may both lower κ. This could harm, or improve,
welfare. Of course, to the extent that ‘mistakes’ are possible here, Spulber and Besanko
(1992)’s suggestion that legal rules can be helpful for implementing simple (but clear)
policy objectives is relevant.21
Our analysis makes predictions about the eﬀects of regulatory independence (along
with the kinds of institutional factors mentioned above) on investment, costs and prices
(see also Currie et al. (1999)). An important requirement for testing these predictions
would be a suitable index of regulatory independence in various countries/industries in
order to compare diﬀerent regulatory regimes. Naturally, such an index would be complex
to produce. However, to the extent that regulatory independence can be shown to have
beneﬁts in theory, such empirical work would provide important insights for policy makers
in this area.
21It should also be noted that there is an equivalent mechanism for achieving our results; namely delega-
tion to a regulator of a particular ‘type’ with preferences α > 1 and instituting institutional arrangements
that prevent further distortion of preferences by lobbying: see Currie et al. (1999).
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A Details of Second-Period Equilibrium Categories
Second-Period Equilibrium b: α ∈ [1,α2]. Only IC2 and IR2 constraints bind.
Putting ζ2 = 0 and eliminating  2 and ξ2 the ﬁrst order conditions (foc) for this equilibrium




2) = Φ(e2) (A.1)
U2 = U(q2,e2,β2) = 0
ψ′(e2) = 1; i.e., e2 = eRO
(1 − ν2)
(1 − η(q2)L(q2))




















U2 = U(q2,e2,β2) = 0 (A.4)
ψ′(e2) = ψ′(e2) = 1; i.e.,e2 = e2 = eRO (A.5)
U2 > U2 + Φ(e2) (A.6)


















U2 > 0 (A.9)
ψ′(e2) = ψ′(e2) = 1; i.e.,e2 = e2 = eRO (A.10)
U2 > U2 + Φ(e2) (A.11)
31B Details of The Investment Decision
Diﬀerentiating the foc in Appendix A we can evaluate the derivatives | ∂U2
∂β2 |:















0. To prove this result, ﬁrst note that the second-period information rent Φ = ψ(e2)−ψ(˜ e2)
is a function of e2 and ∆β2, the latter depending on investment in the ﬁrst period. Write















− ψ′(˜ e2) (B.1)
Therefore the result holds iﬀ a2
(a0+a1)
∂Φ
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ηL2
′ ∂Φ










a0+a1(1 − ψ′(˜ e2)) < (1 − ψ′(˜ e2)), which proves the result.





≤ 0) for the eﬃcient ﬁrm, but i = ˜ i = 0 for the ineﬃcient ﬁrm. For second-period
equilibrium categories c and d it is straightforward to obtain the following results:






= 0. Hence, as before if (22)
holds, i ≥ 0, and mimicking investment ˜ i ≥ 0 for the eﬃcient ﬁrm, but i = ˜ i = 0 for the
ineﬃcient ﬁrm.






= −1. Now, as a result of the extra
rent oﬀered by a captured regulator with α > α2, i, i, ˜ i and ˜ i can all be positive.
32C Details of First Period Equilibrium Categories
Let us now consider each row of this table in turn:
Equilibria (a,∗): IC1,IC1,IR1 bind (ζ1, 1,ξ1 > 0).
Then given x and y, q
1,q1, e1, and e1, are given by (27), (28), (29), (30), (31) and (32),
given the functions i = i(e1) and i′(e1) obtained in section 4.3. This system of equations
allows the possibility of all eﬀorts being greater or less than the Ramsey optimum. The
optimal mechanism for a regulator given α is then found by maximizing the intertemporal
utility (25) with respect to x and y.
Equilibria (b,∗): IC1,IR1 bind (ζ1 = 0;  1,ξ1 > 0).
The ineﬃcient ﬁrm now does not mimic, so the solution is found by putting y = 1, solving
(27), (28), (29), (30), (31) and (33), for  1,ξ1 > 0, q
1,q1, e1, and e1, for a given x, and
then maximizing (25) with respect to x. Now we have that e1 = eRO.
Equilibria (c,∗): IR1 binds (ζ1 =  1 = 0; ξ1 > 0).
There is now no mimicking by either type of ﬁrm and it is now easy to characterize the
equilibrium. Putting x = y = 1, information sets L and H become singletons and we have











U(q1,e1,β1) + δU2 = 0 (C.2)
e1 = e1 = eRO (C.3)
Equilibria (d,∗): Unconstrained. (ζ1 =  1 = ξ1 = 0)
This is the simplest case to characterise. Equations (C.1) and (C.3) apply as before and
(C.2) now becomes
L1 =
p1 − c
p1
=
α − 1
αη(q1)
(C.4)
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